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SIXTH AMENDMENT-CONFRONTATION
AND THE USE OF INTERLOCKING
CONFESSIONS AT JOINT TRIAL
Cruz v. New York, 107 S. Ct. 1716 (1987).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The sixth amendment guarantees a criminal defendant the right
to confront his accusers. 1 In Bruton v. United States,2 the United
States Supreme Court firmly established that, in joint trials of criminal defendants, the right of confrontation bars the use of a nontestifying co-defendant's confession that inculpates other defendants,
even if the introduction of the confession is accompanied by an instruction to the jury not to consider the co-defendant's testimony
against the others. However, in Parkerv. Randolph,3 the Court failed
to decide whether Bruton should apply to a situation in which a defendant had himself confessed in a manner substantially similar to
that of a co-defendant. This question was revisited in Cruz v. New
York, 4 in which the Court held that the co-defendant's confession
was barred in this situation as well.
This Note examines the history of the confrontation clause of
the sixth amendment and the use of confessions of nontestifying codefendants. Additionally, this Note discusses and evaluates the majority and dissenting opinions in Cruz, concluding that the Court's
decision rightly preserves the defendant's constitutional right of
confrontation while not significantly impairing the practice of joint
trials.
II.

FACTS

On March 15, 1982, Jerry Cruz was murdered. 5 Following the
killing, police interrogated Norberto Cruz about his brother's murder.6 On April 27, 1982, Norberto informed the police of a visit by
I U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
2 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
3 442 U.S. 62 (1979).
4 107 S. Ct. 1714 (1987).
5 Id. at 1716.
6 Id.
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Eulogio and Benjamin Cruz 7 to the apartment that Norberto and
Jerry shared. 8 Norberto told police that, during the visit, Eulogio
was nervous and that his clothes were bloodstained. 9 In addition,
Norberto claimed that Eulogio confided in him that he and his
brother Benjamin had tried to rob a gas station the night before.' 0
According to Norberto, Eulogio stated that after an attendant had
interfered and shot Benjamin in the arm, Benjamin killed the attendant. 1 In his testimony to the police, Norberto also claimed that
12
Benjamin had told him a similar story.
On May 3, 1982, the police questioned Benjamin Cruz, who denied having killed Jerry Cruz. l3 In an attempt to prove his honesty,
Benjamin voluntarily confessed to the murder of the gas station attendant.' 4 That evening, Benjamin gave a detailed videotaped confession of the killing which implicated himself, Eulogio, Jerry Cruz,
and a fourth man involved in the gas station incident. 15
Benjamin and Eulogio Cruz were subsequently charged with
the felony murder of the attendant and, over Eulogio's objection,
were triedjointly.16 At trial, also over Eulogio's objection, the court
allowed Benjamin's videotaped confession to be admitted into evidence.' 7 In addition to the videotaped confession, the prosecution
called Norberto, who testified as to the conversations he had had
with Benjamin and Eulogio about the gas station incident.',
Although other evidence was introduced by the prosecution, by the
trial's end, the only admissible evidence against Eulogio directly
linking him to the crime was Norberto's testimony. 19 The trial
judge instructed the jury that Benjamin's confession was not to be
20
used against Eulogio.
Eulogio's attorney claimed that Norberto had fabricated his testimony in order to convict the two brothers who he suspected were
7 Id. Jerry and Norberto were longtime friends of Eulogio and Benjamin, but, despite their sharing of the same last name, these two sets of brothers were unrelated. Id.
8 Id. The visit referred to by Norberto occurred on November 29, 1981. Id.
9 Id.
10 Id
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.

15 Id.
16 Id.

17 Id. at 1716-17.
18 Id. at 1717.
19 Id.

20 Id.
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guilty of killing his brother Jerry.2 ' Unpersuaded by this argument,
the jury convicted both Benjamin and Eulogio for the felony murder
of the gas station attendant. 2 2 In affirming Eulogio's conviction, the
New York Court of Appeals relied upon Parkerv. Randolph,23 which
states that when a co-defendant's confession "interlocks" with the
defendant's confession, the co-defendant's confession does not have
24
to be excluded.
III.

HISTORY

The confrontation clause of the sixth amendment to the United
States Constitution states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses
against him." 2 5 The Supreme Court extended the application of the
confrontation clause to the states in 1965.26 In Delli Paoli v. United
States,2 7 the Court held that, in a joint trial, a nontestifying co-defendant's confession that inculpated the defendant could be introduced at the trial as long as the jury was instructed not to use that
confession in its assessment of the defendant's guilt. 28 The determinative issue in such a case, the Delli Paoli Court said, was "whether
[such] instructions were sufficiently clear and whether it was reasonably possible for the jury to follow them." 29 Furthermore, the Court
asserted that the belief that the jurors might disregard such instructions was "unfounded speculation." 30 The Delli Paoli dissent argued, however, that instructions to disregard a co-defendant's
confession were, as a class, "intrinsically ineffective" and that such a
confession "cannot be wiped from the brains of the jurors." 3 1
Following Delli Paoli, the Court appeared to reconsider its initial
reasoning and moved towards the position of the Delli Paoli dissent.
21 Id.
22 Id.

23 442 U.S. 62 (1979)
24 Cruz, 107 S. Ct. at 1717 (citing People v. Cruz, 66 N.Y.2d 61,485 N.E.2d 221, 495

N.Y.S.2d 14 (1985)).
25 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
26 Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965). The Court held the fourteenth amendment

made the sixth amendment right to confront witnesses obligatory upon the states. Id. at
403. Concurring in the result, Justice Harlan stated that the right of confrontation is
implicit in the concept of "ordered liberty" surrounding the fourteenth amendment. Id.
at 408-09 (Harlan, J., concurring).
27 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
28 Id. at 239, 242.
29 Id. at 239.
30 Id. at 242 (quoting Opper v. United States, 348 U.S. 84, 95 (1954)).
31 Id. at 247 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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In Jackson v. Denno,3 2 the Court ruled that a jury could not be relied
upon to ignore a confession presented to it if that confession later
was found to be involuntary and, thus, inadmissible.3 3 The Court
also revised Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure to
allow for the in camera inspection of any confession made by a defendant that was intended to be introduced at trial.3 4 The Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure Advisory Committee explained that if
the defendant was prejudiced by the co-defendant's confession and
the co-defendant did not take the stand, cross-examination would
be prevented and the limiting instructions to the jury might be in35
sufficient to eliminate the prejudice.
Eventually, the Court overruled Delli Paoli in Bruton v. United
States.36 Writing for the majority in Bruton, Justice Brennan concluded that the jury could not separate the two defendants with respect to the use of the co-defendant's confession.3 7 Justice Brennan
rejected the argument that barring the use of limiting instructions
was a subversion of the jury system, stating:
[T]here are some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or
cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure
so vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations of
the jury system cannot be ignored. Such a context is presented here,
where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the defendant, are
deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial. Not only are the
incriminations devastating to the defendant but their credibility is inevitably suspect .... 38
32

378 U.S. 368 (1964).

33 Id. at 388-89. In stating its distrust of the jury, the Court quoted the dissent in

Delli Paoli: "The government should not have the windfall of having the jury be influenced by evidence ... which, as a matter of law, they (legally) should not consider but
which they cannot put out of their minds." Id. at 388 n. 15 (quoting Delli Paoli, 352 U.S.
at 248).
34 Federal Rule 14 of Criminal Procedure previously stated:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced by a joinder of offenses or of defendants in an indictment or information or by suchjoinder for trial
together, the court may order an election or separate trial of counts, grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires.
4 U.S.C. § 3771 note (1964). In 1966, the rule was amended and the following was
added:
In ruling on a motion by a defendant for severance the court may order the attorney
for the government to deliver to the court for inspection in camera any statements
or confessions made by the defendants which the govenment intends to introduce
in evidence at the trial.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 14.
35 34 F.R.D. 419 (1964). Notably, the amendment gives no standards as to when the
granting of a severance is warranted. Id.
36 391 U.S. 123 (1968).
37 Id. at 132-37.
38 Id. at 135-36 (citation omitted).
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Justice Brennan also addressed the argument that the barring of a
co-defendant's confession would discourage the benefits derived
from the use ofjoint trials.3 9 In Bruton, Justice Brennan contended
that encouraging or preserving joint trials would require sacrificing
'40
"fundamental principles of constitutional liberty."
Soon after Bruton was decided, the Court established that the
admission of a co-defendant's confession in violation of Bruton did
not automatically require the reversal of a conviction. 4 1 In Harrington v. California,42 the Court held that a conviction would be upheld
if the error was "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." 4 3 Several
years later, in Parkerv. Randolph,4 4 the Court was faced with the issue
of whether there should be an exception to the Bruton rule when the
defendant himself confesses and his confession "interlocks" with
the co-defendant's confession. 4 5 Four justices felt there should be
47
such an exception, 4 6 and four justices opposed such an exception.
Justice Powell did not take part in the decision. 4 8 Justice Blackmun
was one of the four justices who believed Bruton was still applicable
to interlocking confessions, but he concurred in the judgment because he felt that in Parker,the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 4 9 Subsequently, the Court ruled in Lee v. Illinois50 that a
co-defendant's confession could be admitted as direct, substantive
evidence against a defendant at a joint trial, provided that there is
sufficient "indicia of reliability." 5 1 Thus, the confession at issue
must have "particularized guarantees of trustworthiness." 5 2 In the
case of interlocking confessions, the Court required that any differences between the two confessions must be "irrelevant or trivial"
because there is a strong presumption against admitting such evidence. 53 After the ensuing confusion in the federal courts of ap39 Id. at 134.
40 Id. (citing People

v. Fisher, 249 N.Y. 419, 432, 164 N.E.2d 336, 341 (1928)).

41 Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 252 (1969).
42

Id.

43

Id. at 254.

44 442 U.S. 62 (1979).
45
46

Id. at 72.

Id. at 64. Justice Rehnquist wrote the plurality decision and was joined by Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and White. Id.
47 Id. at 81 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Brennan
and Marshall in dissent.
48 Id. at 77.
49 Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment).
50 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986).
51 Id. at 2065.
52 Id. at 2064 (citing Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980)).
53 Id. at 2065.
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peals, 5 4 the Court in Cruz revisited the issue it left undecided in
Parker.55
IV.

MAJORITY OPINION

Cruz,5 6

In
the United States Supreme Court, in a five-to-four
decision reversed the New York Court of Appeals' affirmation of Eulogio's conviction. The Court held that in ajoint trial the confession
of a nontestifying co-defendant could not be introduced, even if the
jury has been given instructions to ignore the confession in assessing the defendant's guilt and even if the defendant has given a con57
fession that "interlocked" with the co-defendant's confession.
Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia concluded that the admission of
the co-defendant's confession would violate the confrontation
58
clause of the sixth amendment.
Justice Scalia began his analysis by reviewing the history of the
confrontation clause and its application to joint trials. 59 After noting the application of the confrontation clause to the states, Justice
Scalia stated that in the situation in which two or more defendants
are tried jointly, the confrontation clause makes the pretrial confession of one defendant that inculpates the co-defendants inadmissible unless there is a waiver of the confessing defendant's fifth
60
amendment rights.
Following his brief discussion of the confrontation clause, Justice Scalia explained that a witness can only be considered "against"
a defendant if his testimony is part of the body of evidence the jury
may consider in assessing the defendant's guilt.61 Justice Scalia
noted, therefore, that when a witness' testimony is introduced with
limiting instructions to the jury that the testimony can be used in
assessing the guilt of only one of the defendants, the testimony can
then be admitted. 62 However, the majority stated that the Bruton
case created an exception to the general principle where the testi54 According to justice White, the courts of appeals judges were about evenly split as
to whether Bruton was applicable in interlocking confession cases. Compare United States

v. DiGillio, 538 F.2d 972 (3rd Cir. 1976)(holding Bruton applicable), with United States v.
Paternina-Vergara, 749 F.2d 993 (2nd Cir. 1984)(holding Bruton inapplicable), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1217 (1985).
55 Cruz, 107 S. Ct. 1714.
56 107 S. Ct. 1714.
57 Id. at 1719.
58 Id. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined Justice Scalia's
opinion. Id. at 1716.
59 Id. at 1717.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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mony comes from a confession of a co-defendant who is not testifying at trial. 63 Relying on Bruton, Justice Scalia stated that an
exception is justified if the risk of the jury's being able to ignore
limiting instructions is high and the resulting consequences are too
great.64
The majority next discussed the Parker decision. 6 5 In Parker,
Justice Scalia stated that the factual situation was the same as in
Bruton, except that the confessing defendant in Parker had "recited
essentially the same facts as those of his nontestifying codefendants." 66 In Parker, the plurality of four Justices, Justice Scalia com67
mented, found no violation of the confrontation clause.
Reviewing the Parker plurality's opinion, Justice Scalia emphasized
that the plurality had reasoned that in a situation in which the defendant had himself confessed, the damaging effect on his case
would be so great as to render any Bruton error inconsequential.68
Thus, Justice Scalia concluded that the plurality believed that the
co-defendant's confession would "seldom, if ever" have the "devastating" character referred to in Bruton.69 Furthermore, Justice Scalia
stated that "impeaching that confession on cross-examination
'would likely yield small advantage.'"70 Justice Scalia also noted
that the remaining justices in Parker agreed with Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion, which stated that although in some cases such
admissions of the co-defendant's "interlocking" confession would
indeed be harmless, such an admission would still constitute a viola7
tion of the confrontation clause. '
In Cruz, Justice Scalia declared that the Court was adoptingJustice Blackmun's reasoning in his concurrence in Parker.7 2 Justice
Scalia remarked that although the "devastating" effect of a codefendant's confession on the defendant's case was a factor considered in Bruton, it was only one justification for the Bruton exception. 73 In addition, Justice Scalia asserted, "interlocking
confessions" could not be considered nondestructive to the defendId.
Id. The HarringtonCourt held that a Bruton-type error that was "harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt" would not cause a conviction to be overturned. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 252, 254 (1969).
65 Id. at 1717-18.
66 Id. at 1717.
67 Id.
68 Id. at 1717-18.
69 Id. at 1718.
70 Id. (quoting Parker,442 U.S. 62, 73 (1979).
71 Id.
72 Id.
73 Id.
63
64
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ant per se. 74 Indeed, Justice Scalia maintained that "[i]t is impossible to imagine why there should be excluded from that category, as
generally not 'devastating,' codefendant confessions that 'interlock'
with the defendant's own confession." 75 The present case, Justice
Scalia added, was an example of how difficult the effect of the co76
defendant's confession on the jury would be to predict.
Justice Scalia proceeded by rationalizing that the "interlocking"
nature of the confessions made the admission of the co-defendant's
confession more, not less, devastating. 77 As a practical matter, he
claimed, the defendant will be trying to avoid his confession, not
stand by it.78 Justice Scalia reasoned that "[a] codefendant's confession will be relatively harmless if the incriminating story it tells is
different from that which the defendant himself is alleged to have
told, but enormously damaging if it confirms, in all essential respects, the defendant's alleged confession." 79 Referring to the facts
of the present case, Justice Scalia explained that by admitting Benjamin Cruz's confession, the lower court had harmed Eulogio's attempt to prove that Norberto had fabricated the story of Eulogio's
confession. 80
Justice Scalia supported his position by emphasizing that what
the "interlocking" nature of the confessions "pertains to is not its
harmfulness but rather its reliability."'8 1 The more confessions interlock, Justice Scalia concluded, the more likely it is that the confessions are truthful. 82 Reliability, Justice Scalia noted, is relevant to
the question of whether the co-defendant's confession might be allowed as direct evidence against the defendant, even without an opportunity for cross-examination. 83
However, Justice Scalia
remarked that the reliability issue is neither relevant to the question
74 Id.

75 Id. Justice Scalia quoted the dissent in Parker: "[T]he infinite variability of inculpatory statements (whether made by defendants or co-defendants), and of their likely
effect on juries, makes [the assumption that an interlocking confession will preclude devastation] untenable." Id. (quoting Parker, 442 U.S. at 84 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
76 Id. Justice Scalia noted that in the present case the harmful effect of the defendant's confession was difficult to determine as it was dependent on the extent to which
one believed Norberto's testimony. Id.
77 Id.

78 Id. Justice Scalia suggested possible explanations the defendant might use to
avoid his confession, such as the fact that the confession was false or inaccurately reported. Id.
79 Id.

80 Id.
81 Id. (emphases in original).
82 Id.
83 Id. at 1718-19. Justice Scalia referred to Lee v. Illinois, 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986). See
supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text for a discussion of Lee v. Illinois.

19881

INTERLOCKING CONFESSIONS

945

of whether the jury is still capable of obeying instructions to disregard such testimony nor relevant to the effect on the defendant's
case if the jury does not obey its instructions.8 4 Justice Scalia asserted that "[t]he law cannot command respect if such an inexplicable exception to a supposed constitutional imperative is adopted. 8 5
8 6 JusNext, Justice Scalia responded to the dissentingjustices.
tice Scalia asserted that the Court's opinion had reaffirmed the basic
proposition of Bruton and had not extended Bruton to an illogical
result.8 7 Justice Scalia reiterated his belief that the presence of the
defendant's confession neither reduced the likelihood that the jury
would consider the co-defendant's confession against the defendant
nor reduced the harmful effects on the defendant's case if the codefendant's confession was in fact considered.8 8
In conclusion, Justice Scalia repeated that courts have the
power to admit the nontestifying co-defendant's confession as direct
evidence against the defendant.8 9 However, once the confession is
determined not to be directly admissible against the defendant, the
confrontation clause bars its admissibility at a joint trial regardless
of whether a limiting instruction to the jury admonishing it not to
consider such a confession against the defendant is given.90
V.

MINORITY OPINION

Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Powell and O'Connor, strongly dissented from the majority. 9 1 Justice White began by discussing the facts of Bruton9 2 and characterized the case as holding that the nontestifying co-defendant's
confession could be barred only in certain cases in which the risk
that the jury would disobey the limiting instructions would be so
damaging to the defendant's case as to constitute constitutional
error.93
The dissent then distinguished the facts of Cruz from the facts
of Bruton, noting that Eulogio Cruz, unlike the defendant in Bruton,
84
85

107 S. Ct. at 1719.
Id.

86 Id.
87 Id. Justice Scalia noted that the dissent had characterized the majority's opinion as
"remorseless logic." Id.
88 Id.
89 Id.

90 Id.

91 Id. at 1719-22 (White, J., dissenting).
92 Id. at 1719 n.1 (White, J., dissenting).
93 Id. at 1720 (White, J., dissenting).
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had confessed. 9 4 According to Justice White, the majority in Cruz
held:
the co-defendant's confession was inadmissible even if it completely
"interlocked" with that of Cruz himself, that is, was substantially the
same as and consistent with Cruz's confession with respect to all elements of the crime and did not threaten to incriminate Cruz any more
than his own confession. 9 5
Justice White questioned the logic of such a holding, asserting that
"the defendant's own confession is probably the most probative and
damaging evidence that can be admitted against him." 9 6 Justice
White reasoned that the defendant is the best source of information
about his own conduct, while a co-defendant's out-of-court statements regarding the defendant "have traditionally been viewed with
special suspicion." 9 7 Therefore, Justice White continued, with the
proper admission of a defendant's confession in court, the jury
would not be as tempted to rely on the co-defendant's out-of-court
statements and, thus, would be able to obey its instructions to ignore the co-defendant's confession with regards to the defendant. 98
Furthermore, Justice White stated that even if the jury disobeyed its instructions, the effect would not necessarily be as devastating as it was in Bruton.99 Justice White stated that the Court had
ignored the potentially devastating effect that the defendant's confession would probably have on the defendant's case. 10 0 Justice
White urged that application of the Bruton rule should be confined
to situations in which "there is the greatest risk that jury misconduct
[would lead] to the conviction of an innocent defendant." 10 1 In
general, Justice White continued, cases in which the defendant had
not confessed fit this exception, as a class, much better than cases in
02
which the defendant had confessed.1
Justice White then strongly attacked the majority's conclusions
as being a result of "remorseless logic" and as countering common
sense. 10 3 He noted that the Court, in Richardson v. Marsh,10 4 had
94 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
95 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
96

Id. (White, J., dissenting)(quoting Bruton, 391 U.S. at 139 (White, J., dissenting)).

97 Id. (White, J., dissenting).

98 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
99 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
100 Id. at n.2 (White, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 1721 n.2 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White believed that the prophylactic
nature of Bruton and the burden Bruton places on prosecutors demanded this approach,
thus overshadowing the majority's belief that the damaging effect of the defendant's
confession would vary from case to case. Id. (White, J., dissenting).
102 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
103 Id. at 1720-21 (White, J., dissenting).
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recently rejected a claim that, when a co-defendant's confession was
redacted to eliminate any reference to the defendant, a Bruton-type
error might result if the jury were to make inferences by considering
the confession together with other evidence. 10 5 According to Justice White, the Richardson Court recognized that Bruton should not
be "followed to the outer limits of its logic."' 1 6 The dissent asserted that the holding in Richardson was, therefore, inconsistent
with the Court's ruling in the present case.' 0 7 Justice White also
claimed that the majority of the courts of appeals either endorsed or
favored his view, with many of the others taking "the harmless error
route. "108
In conclusion, Justice White predicted that prosecutors would
not seek joint trials in cases involving interlocking confessions. 0 9
Justice White stated that although separate trials avoided possible
Bruton problems, joint trials were socially desirable because they
saved state funds, reduced the amount of inconvenience to witnesses and public officials, avoided court delays, and generally alleviated the burdens on the court system. 10 Justice White also noted
the possibility that separate trials could result in "inconsistent verdicts.""' As with the majority opinion, the Cruz dissent ended its
opinion by noting that Lee v. Illinois 112 suggested that interlocking
confessions would often be directly admissible against the defendant and reminded the New York courts that on remand it should
reconsider allowing the co-defendant's confession to be admitted
3
directly against Eulogio Cruz.1"
VI.

DIsCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

Cruz exemplifies the Court's proper concern over preserving a
defendant's right to confront his accusers despite possible obstructions to an efficient criminal procedure. In Cruz, the Court examined the potential effects on the defendant if the jury were unable
to adhere to its instructions not to use the co-defendant's confession
104 Id. at 1702 (1987).
105 Id. at 1721. (White, J., dissenting).
106 Id. (WhiteJ, dissenting).
107 Id. (White, J, dissenting).
108 Id. at 1721 n.3 (White, J, dissenting).
109 Id. (White, J., dissenting).
11 I Id. (White, J, dissenting).
111 Id. (White, J., dissenting). Presumably, Justice White meant that, between two

equally culpable defendants being tried separately, one could be aquitted and the other
could be convicted.
112 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986).
113 Cruz, 107 S. Ct. at 1722 (WhiteJ, dissenting).
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against the defendant in its determination of the defendant's guilt or
innocence.1 4 Both Justice Scalia and Justice White focused on how
the defendant's and the co-defendant's confessions would
interact.115
Justice Scalia concluded that the introduction of a confession by
the defendant will increase the potential that the co-defendant's
confession will damage the defendant's case.1 1 6 Such a conclusion
has an intuitive appeal. It seems more likely that Benjamin's detailed confession persuaded, rather than dissuaded, the jury to believe in Norberto's vague and suspect testimony. It is likely that
Benjamin's corroboration of Norberto's testimony hurt the credibility of Eulogio's claim that Norberto had fabricated his story in order
to gain revenge against Eulogio. Other examples also support Justice Scalia's conclusion. In his dissent in Parker,117 Justice Stevens
gave an example of a nontestifying co-defendant giving a detailed
videotaped confession which implicated both himself and the defendant. 118 The only evidence directly admissible against the defendant was circumstantial, except for the testimony of a third party
stating that he "vaguely recalled" the defendant saying that he was
with the co-defendant at the time of the killing. 1 9 Justice Stevens,
like Justice Scalia, felt that, in such a situation, a third party's testimony would increase the danger that the jury would rely on the codefendant's confession in deciding the defendant's verdict. 12 0 Conversely, Justice White's theory in Cruz, in which he concluded that in
a case in which the co-defendants' confessions interlock the jury will
obey its instructions, is flawed. His reasoning that the defendant's
confession will so overshadow the co-defendant's out-of-court testimony that the jury will not be tempted to disobey its instructions
Id. at 1718-20.
Justice Scalia's opinion is located id. at 1717-18; Justice White's opinion is located
id. at 1720 (White, J., dissenting).
116 Id. at 1718.
117 Parker, 442 U.S. 62, 81 (1979)(Stevens, J., dissenting).
118 Id. at 84-85 (Stevens,J., dissenting). Justice Stevens stated the scenario as follows:
Suppose a prosecutor has 10 items of evidence tending to prove that defendant X
and codefendant Y are guilty of assassinating a public figure. The first is the tape of
a televised interview with Y describing in detail how he and X planned and executed
the crime. Items 2 through 9 involve circumstantial evidence of a past association
between X and Y, a shared hostility for the victim, and an expressed wish for his
early demise-evidence that in itself might very well be insufficient to convict X.
Item 10 is the testimony of a drinking partner, a former cellmate, or a divorced
spouse of X who vaguely recalls X saying that he had been with Y at the approximate time of the killing. Neither X nor Y takes the stand.
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
119 Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
120 Id. at 85 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
114
115
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assumes that all defendants' confessions are equally reliable.' 2 1 A
dubious confession, however, would not carry the persuasive force
needed to overcome the jury's tendency to look to other sources
against the defendant. Often, the defendant's confession may be
22
coerced or, as in Cruz, come from a potentially prejudiced source.'
Yet, Justice White appears to believe that once the defendant has
confessed and that confession has been admitted, his case has already been lost. 1 2 3 Justice White's scenario may be true in some
cases, but in others it subjects defendants who would not be convicted based on the admissible evidence against them to the possi12 4
bility of being found guilty due to a Bruton-type error.
In fact, regardless of the effect the defendant's confession has
on his case, this effect will not erase the presence of constitutional
error. By confessing, the defendant should not lose his constitutional rights, including the right to confront his accuser, namely, the
co-defendant. The admission of the co-defendant's confession constitutes such an error under Bruton because a potential that the jury
will use the non-cross-examined testimony is present. Although the
Harrington Court held that a Bruton error does not necessitate the
overturning of a conviction, the HarringtonCourt recognized that an
error had been committed. 125 Thus, the reviewing court must analyze all of the circumstances in the case to determine whether the
error was, in fact, "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."' 126 In
Parker,Justice Blackmun theorized that in most interlocking confession cases the error would be harmless, but he still argued that the
Harrington standard should apply. 12 7 Conversly, the plurality in
121 Cf. Parker, 442 U.S. at 84 (Stevens, J., dissenting)("But the infinite variability of
inculpatory statements ...and their likely effect on juries, make those assertions [that all
co-defendant confessions are equally reliable] untenable.").
122 See id. at 85-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens also noted that a confession may be due to "the well recognized and often untrustworthy 'urge to confess .......
Id. at 86 (Stevens, J., dissenting)(footnote omitted). See also id. at 86 n.6 (Stevens, J.
dissenting)(citing Foster, Confessions and the Station House Syndrome, 18 DE PAUL L. REV.
683 (1969); Sterling, Police Interrogation and the Psychology of Confession, 14 J. PuB. L. 25
(1965)).
123 Cruz, 107 S.Ct. at 1720 (White, J., dissenting). For example, Justice White refers
to "the devastating effect that the defendant's own confession is likely to have upon his
case." Id. at n.2 (White, J., dissenting).
124 See Haddad, Post-Bruton Developments: A Reconsideration of the Confrontation Rationale,
and a Proposalfor a Due ProcessEvaluation of Limiting Instructions, 18 AMER. CluM. L. REv. 1,
30 (1980). "[N]either empirical data nor common intuition supports such a generalization [that in the presence of a defendant's confession the jury is less likely to consider
the co-defendant's confession]. One may just as easily speculate that ajury is more likely
[to do just the opposite]." Id (emphasis in original).
125 Harrington, 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
126 Id. at 252-54.
127 Parker, 442 U.S. at 79 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Parkerand the dissent in Cruz limited Bruton's assumption of a consti1 28
tutional error to cases in which the defendant had not confessed.
In cases in which the defendant has confessed, the less stringent test
of whether the confessions were truly interlocked would be substituted for the harmless error analysis. Under this new standard, relevant considerations such as the defendant's or co-defendant's
credibility would not be considered.
In Cruz, the focus on how the confessions of the defendant and
the co-defendant might interact in the minds of the jurors detracted
from a discussion of the basic principles of the confrontation clause.
In Californiav. Green, 12 9 it was stated by the Court that confrontation
(1) insures that the witness will give his statements under oath-thus
impressing him with the seriousness of the matter and guarding
against the lie by the possibility of a penalty for perjury; (2) forces the
witness to submit to cross-examination, the "greatest legal engine ever
invented for the discovery of truth"; (3) permits the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate to observe the demeanor of the witness in
making his 0 statement, thus aiding the jury in assessing his
13
credibility.
It is difficult to see why these three goals of the confrontation clause
should be disregarded when the witness happens to be the co-defendant in a joint trial. Parts one and three of the above passage
recognize how the Cruz minority was mistaken in its belief that a
defendant's confession will always render a co-defendant's confession inconsequential and make confrontation unnecessary. The
analysis shows that attributes such as a co-defendant's character and
his propensity for lying when he is seemingly outside the court's
influence will vary widely among co-defendants. Like all other witnesses, the impact of co-defendants's confessions on ajury will vary.
As for the second rationale mentioned in Green, it is unwise to risk a
defendant's "greatest legal engine" on the basis of the belief of
some that the jury will be capable of ignoring damaging testimony
in certain situations. If the defendant disagrees with that belief, his
only alternative would be to abandon his constitutional right to a
13 1
jury trial.
Furthermore, the concept of the "interlocking of confessions"
has not been adequately defined, thereby making it difficult to fore128 See id. at 74-75; Cruz, 107 S. Ct. at 1720 (White, J., dissenting).
129 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
130 Id. at 158 (quoting 5J. WIGMORE, TREATISE ON THE ANGLO AMERICAN SYSTEM OF
EVIDENCE § 1367 (1923).
131 The sixth amendment to the Constitution provides, in relevant part, that "[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury of the State ....
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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see under what circumstances an exception to Bruton might apply.
In Parker,it was unclear what the plurality considered as constituting
an interlocked confession. Justice Blackmun stated that the plurality
"simply assume[d] the interlock."' 13 2 Justice Blackmun worried that
the decision of the Parkerplurality might be applied when two confessions only partially interlocked or when one confession impli33
cated the defendant more than did his own confession.1
In Cruz, Justice White attempts to define "interlocked" confessions as arising in a situation in which the co-defendant's confession
is "substantially the same as and consistent with [the defendant's]
confession with respect to all the elements of the crime and [does]
not threaten to incriminate [the defendant] any more than his own
confession."' 3 4 This analysis leaves unanswered the question of
which confessions would not be similar or reliable enough to warrant their direct admissibility but would be similar enough to warrant an exception to the Bruton rule. It is unclear what is meant by
the phrase "substantially the same as," and lower courts conceivably
could develop greatly different standards in this regard. Comparatively, the Harringtonharmless error test is better established and
13 5
more protective of the defendant's rights.
Justice White's concern in Cruz with the implications the majority's decision might have on the court system focused upon the potential increase in separate trials and the resulting depletion of
government funds and increase in delays. 13 6 Apart from the view
that the Court should not consider economic factors when a basic
constitutional right is at stake, 137 the minority's fears seem more
theoretical than real. In neither Cruz nor in any of the Court's other
post-Bruton rulings has there been any mention of the Bruton rule
overburdening the judicial system; and, presumably, because Cruz
encompasses part of the issues addressed in Bruton, no new burden
Parker, 442 U.S. at 80 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
134 Cruz, 107 S. Ct. at 1720 (White, J., dissenting).
135 For recent cases applying the harmless error test to Bruton violations, see Holland
v. Attorney Gen., 777 F.2d 150 (4th Cir. 1985)(error not harmless, as evidence of defendant's guilt was not overwhelming); Clark v. Maggio, 737 F.2d 471 (5th Cir. 1984)
(error held harmless), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1055 (1985); United States v. Ruff, 717 F.2d
855 (3rd Cir. 1983)(admission of unredacted confession held harmless), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 1051 (1984). See supra notes 42 and 46 and accompanying text for discussions of
Harningtonv. Caifornia.
136 Cruz, 107 S. Ct. at 1721 (White, J., dissenting). For a general discussion on the
costs and benefits ofjoint trials, see Dawson,Joint Trials of Defendants in CriminalCases: An
Analysis of Efficiencies and Prdudices, 77 MicH. L. REv. 1379 (1979).
137 See Bruton, 391 U.S. at 134.
132

133
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has been added. 13 8
Furthermore, the Court has affirmed a method for prosecutors
to use in their introducing of a co-defendant's confession with limitingjury instructions. In Richardson v. Marsh,13 9 the Court upheld the
use of redacted confessions if the co-defendant's confession does
not contain either the defendant's name or any reference to the defendant's existence, even if there is other evidence introduced at
trial that links the defendant to the confession. 14 0 Although the
Court's presumptions about the effects of redacted confessions are
questionable, 14 1 Richardson does reduce the number of cases in
which the co-defendant's confession will be inadmissible.
Also, an alternative to separate trials is the multiple jury trial.
In that situation, a separate jury is impanelled for each co-defendant. The jury for the defendant would not hear the confession of
the nontestifying co-defendant, but other evidence would be
presented to both juries simultaneously. If the proceedings can be
coordinated properly, the multiple jury trial can accomplish most of
14 2
the savings of a joint trial, without prejudicing the defendant.
Justice White's urging that the New York Court of Appeals reconsider whether the co-defendant's confession might be directly
admissible against Eulogio under the principles articulated in Lee v.
Illinois 14 3 is also questionable. It is likely that if courts begin to hold
more confessions directly admissible under Lee it will reduce the
number of Bruton issues that courts must confront. However, if the
Court redefines the standard of admissibility in Lee, it not only will
render its ruling in Cruz meaningless, but it will also go beyond the
minority's opinion because in such a situation there would not even
be limiting instructions to the jury.
VII.

CONCLUSION

On its surface, the Court's holding in Cruz v. New York repre138 See, e.g., Cruz, 107 S. Ct. 1716 (1987); Lee, 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986); Parker,442 U.S.
62 (1979).
139 107 S. Ct. 1702 (1987).
140 Id. at 1707-08. Again, writing for the Court, Justice Scalia said that in this situation there would not exist the "overwhelming probability" that the jury would disobey
its instructions. Id. at 1708.
141 See Dawson, supra note 136, at 1414. Many courts abuse the redaction rule, often
to a point in which it is "as clear as pointing and shouting" that the defendant is the
"other person," "X," or "blank." Id. It is difficult to understand why this seemingly
slight obstacle to the jury's use of the confession against the defendant allayed the fears
Justice Scalia had in Cruz.
142 Morris & Savitt, Bruton Revisited: One Trial/TwoJuries, 12 PROSECUTOR 92 (1976).
143 106 S. Ct. 2056 (1986). See supra note 50 and accompanying text for a discussion
of Lee v. Illinois.

1988]

INTERLOCKING CONFESSIONS

953

sents a strong affirmation of the Court's belief in protecting defendants in joint trials from the potential harm arising from the
admission of the non-cross-examined testimony of their co-defendants. The ruling is especially impressive given the background of a
severely overburdened court system and given that the issue required the Court to speculate on the mental processes ofjurors, in
which widely differing scenarios of how juries make decisions can
have, at the least, face validity. By holding Bruton applicable in the
interlocking confession situation, the Cruz Court helped to insure
that a criminal defendant will not lose his constitutional rights simply because he has confessed. However, the real effect of the Cruz
holding remains to be seen. If, subsequent to Cruz, the Court indicates it has softened its standards for admitting an interlocking confession directly against a defendant under Lee, then the Court's
holding in Cruz will be merely symbolic.
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